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1INTRODUCTION
Therefore, analyze the enemy’s battle plan to understand its merits and its weaknesses; provoke him to
find out the pattern of his movements; make him show himself (hsing) to discover the viability of his
battle position; skirmish with him to find out where he is strong and where he is vulnerable.
Sun Tzu, The Art of Warfare
On April 1, 2001, a collision between a United States Navy EP-3 Aries II Reconnaissance plane and a Chinese
F-8 fighter jet prompted a renewal of an old debate inside the Washington, DC Beltway and around the world
concerning the intentions and direction of the rising Chinese power. That single event further polarized an
already divided political community into their respective conservative and liberal beliefs about the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). This paper strives to understand the intentions of the leadership inside of China
through a theoretical prism. The epigraph from the work of Sun Tzu illustrates the motivations for exploring
future relations between the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, the United States, and the Middle East. Only
by analyzing Chinese military modernizations in the last decade, economic trends, human rights abuses, the
behavior of the ruling Communist Party, as well as other indicators can international relations scholars predict
whether China is emerging as a partner or a peer competitor to the United States.
In order to assess the ambitions of the Chinese government, the author has chosen to explain the
developments in Asia by way of the realist theory of international relations. In doing so, the intent is not to
prove the validity of realism in contemporary international relations, but rather takes the approach of Frank W.
Wayman and Paul F. Diehl in their book, Reconstructing Realpolitik, and evaluates whether realism in its
skeletal definition is applicable to the changing dynamics of the People’s Republic of China. The author
acknowledges the shortcomings of realism as a way of all-inclusively explaining and predicting state
interactions, but will address the deficiencies of the realist school of thought as they arise with respect to the
People’s Republic of China.
Bifurcating the concept of realism allows for the evolution of an offensive and a defensive branch of
realism and in doing so increases the explanatory precision of realism. These two ideas will be explained further
in the next section, yet an elementary definition is needed to begin. Offensive realism implies that a state will
build up its security and economic apparatuses as the basic tenets of realism prescribe. The offensive realist
state will use this power maximization in order to project its influence to any theater that can be used to increase
further the absolute power of the state. Such an idea connotes a quasi-imperialist state that will use its power to
influence the social, political, economic, and security sectors of other states. This aggressiveness operates under
the seemingly zero-sum game that if State A does not build up its forces to bring lesser states under its control,
then State B will do so and use its heightened sphere of influence to force State A to acquiesce to its demands.
On the other hand, while the concept of defensive realism assumes that a state will also build up its security
and economic complexes, the intention is to gain as much power as is necessary to defend the state and its
interests and thus power is not merely for its own sake. This idea may perplex one into suggesting that a
“reasonable defense” is a very relative term especially under the auspices of an anarchical system. Nevertheless,
defensive realism assumes that a state will build up power and project it to gain as the Chinese say, “jing gho,”
or safe Chinese borders. The exact definition of which borders need to be safe will be addressed in a later
portion of the paper.
The subsequent portions of this work will pursue three goals: (1) to arrive at a clear and concise
understanding of offensive and defensive realism; (2) to provide a thorough analysis of modern Chinese foreign
policy through the lens of realism; and (3) to hypothesize about future power projections by China. In analyzing
modern Chinese foreign policy, historical and social components as well as the evolution of the Chinese
political system will be briefly addressed. The majority of analysis, though, rests in the economic and security
aspects of foreign policy; keying the growing dependence of the Chinese economy on imported oil and the
potential for projecting power in order to secure resources vis-à-vis a growing and modernizing military.
Additionally, this paper will look at the security aspect of modern Chinese foreign policy and attempt to discern
whether China’s military policy represents a genuine modernization of an aging system or the preparation for
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offensive power projection. The underlying purpose and aim of this research is to understand how the Chinese
policymakers are thinking and what their intentions are. Incorporating case studies of neighboring countries,
Taiwan, the Middle East, and the United States into a framework of defensive realism, one will have a model
that explains past and present Chinese behavior as well as a model capable of predicting the next steps China
will take.
The core argument of this paper remains that the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China is
consistent with the theory of defensive realism. Specifically, China is trying to secure its Asian sphere of
influence and acquire what it sees fit as necessary to defend a developing nation. Furthermore, the idea of jing
gho, and thus a defensive zone, consists of Taiwan, all portions of mainland China, and arguably many of the
oil-rich islands of the South China Sea including, but not limited to, the Spratley Islands.  Attacks and so-called
saber-rattling against the United States are not intentionally malevolent policies, but done rather to pressure the
United States not to involve itself with China’s actions and aspirations along the periphery of the South China
Sea. Offensive power projections (such as towards the Middle East and/or the United States) are ineffective and
hold no true threat, for the current structure of China’s security and economic apparatuses (let alone its social
and political culture) retains only intermittent and limited capability to exert their forces. Although “nuisance
challenges” such as the downing of the US Navy plane or Chinese assistance to Iraq’s Air Force do not pose a
threat to the US survival, China’s policies in the Asian theater as well as in the Middle East are threats to the
national security of the United States and cannot be ignored. Simply put, though, a state operating within a
defensive realist framework, such as the People’s Republic of China, would conclude, based on a rational cost-
benefit analysis, that its current social, economic, political, and military resources are not suited to challenge the
hegemon in the near term.
3PART ONE
Realism Bifurcated: Offensive and Defensive Realism
In order to determine the future of Chinese foreign policy, it is essential to draw upon the basic principles of the
realist theory of international relations. Realism in its purest form is based upon the following assumptions: 1)
that states are primary and rational actors, 2) states adjust their policies in order to further their own self-
interests, and 3) for states, military and national security interests are the principal policies.1 Further along in
this analysis some of these assumptions will be slightly relaxed, at times incorporating principles related to
structural realism. The author believes that in order to truly understand how a state is operating, one must study
social, economic, security, and political elements of a country and how each of these parts interacts with one
another. Such adjustments will include the role of multinational corporations and international organizations in
the policy calculus, and economic determinants will be combined with military factors in determining the power
of a state. Thus, the principal measures of power potential are population, gross national product (GNP),
military size, and defense expenditures and trends. Only by incorporating all of these dynamics can a researcher
grasp how a country’s leadership is thinking and as such, what that leadership’s next moves will be.
Realists divide state interests into those that are considered high politics—security and survival—and low
politics—trade and other socio-economic policies. Under realism, the state will use all means necessary to
achieve the objectives of the state up to and including the use of force.2 Additionally, the capacity for one state
to influence another state is determined by: 1) its capabilities, 2) its willingness to assert these capabilities and
accept the consequences, and 3) a state’s relative capabilities compared to its competitor that may also include
non-traditional power determinants.3
Realism concludes that states are motivated by power and national interest and as such will pursue gains
relative to their peers and adversaries. The argument continues that in a system characterized by anarchy and
threats viewed as omnipresent, a state will strive to increase its tangible power assets in comparison to its
nearest threat or competitor.4 Subsequently, nations will seek to maintain their territorial integrity and will focus
on military security in its interactions with other actors in the system. Additionally, material capabilities,
leadership, and unity are viewed as the center of power. States may also form alliances to balance power and
thus increase their relative security.5 Because states are rational actors, they will assess the costs and benefits of
engaging in provocative actions and determine whether or not the expected utility that can come from such
aggressive policies will be worth the consequences.6
The realist’s pursuit of security vis-à-vis power amalgamation tends to lead actors, especially those
adhering to defensive realism, towards strategies of deterrence. This is in part because military policies under
realism will most likely result in some sort of an arms race characterized by the security dilemma and will be in
pursuit of a minimum credible deterrent. In classic deterrence, a state will avoid projecting force onto another
state for fear that such an action will result in retaliation with unacceptably high casualties and damage. As this
paper will later demonstrate, attempting to deploy China’s increased military might against the United States
would be fruitless, for it would surely result in massive losses or possibly the destruction of the People’s
Republic of China depending on the extent of such a challenge. However, the desire to confront the United
States has been observed in the plane crash during April 2001 and hard-line rhetoric throughout recent years
from the Chinese government. Nevertheless, a fundamental lack of ability or willingness to act upon such
desires leads to the security dilemma. In such a circumstance, relative changes in the policies or actions of one
state are viewed in an extremely skeptical light by a rival. As such, a buildup of arms, military mobilizations, or
economically aggressive policies by State A are met with equal policies by State B and so on. The dyadic
relationship characterized by the security dilemma is an environment ripe with misperceptions by both states
and a fundamental lack of trust for any verbal or written commitment. This ambiguity of motivation contributes
in part to the growing mistrust and turbulence between the United States and the People’s Republic of China
that will be highlighted later in this paper.
The problem with such a security dilemma is illustrated as a case in point with the People’s Republic of
China’s recent military modernization projects and economic expansion. A state’s own quest for security and
stability may generate its own security dilemma by appearing seemingly threatening to others.7 Based on this
paper’s research, it is fair to conclude that China’s motivations for modernization and the policies that have
been used to pursue this modernization have resulted in a security dilemma. In other words, calls to nationalist
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pride combined with growing trade deficits in China’s favor, aggressive military buildups and modernization,
and hard-line political agendas have led other states to feel that they might be the target of China’s newfound
power, and only gains relative to the Chinese will keep their countries safe.
However, realists also argue that a competitor will strive to emulate the policies and general characteristics
of the state to which they aspire in order to be viewed as similar and non-threatening by the hegemon and
international community.8 To support this argument is China’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing and
the drive for admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Neither policy would seem to improve the
security of China drastically; however, being a member of the WTO and hosting the Olympic Games bring
economic implications and prestige—signs of a powerful nation on the rise. No longer would the PRC be
viewed as a rogue power, engaged in diplomatic tiffs over Taiwan and a downed US Navy plane, but as a
mainstream country capable of rivaling what is at times viewed as a heavy-handed United States. Great powers
are rewarded if they appear both strong and potentially dangerous because states ally with the strongest and
most threatening powers.
At the same time, it must be mentioned that realism often suggests that states will balance against a
threatening hegemon. In many respects this is what can be observed through China’s behavior. China has
worked to be a participant in international organizations, treaties, and events in order to appear benign to the
United States and the rest of the world, yet these policies simply represent efforts towards power amalgamation
by the Chinese government. Part of this is the argument that states will seek out policies that increase their
relative power compared to their nearest competitors. Alliances may provide relative gains for a state in terms
of rapid increases in power potential, yet they hold no promise for a lasting, trustworthy dyadic relationship, as
most alliances are seen as temporary. As these basic principles of realism have now been established, the next
step is to break the large concept of realism down into its two variations: offensive and defensive.
Offensive and Defensive Realism
In the simplest bifurcation of realism, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller argue that realism is composed of
both an aggressive and offensive version and of a more defensive orientation. In offensive realism, states view
security as a fixed pie; unless a state works to increase its own security and resources by coercive means, others
will take their portions and use them against the state that surrendered such capabilities in order to obtain more
security. In such a circumstance, war and other aggressive military postures are more likely, and international
competition will be rampant. At the same time, those states that believe that there is an infinite amount of
security in the international system will adopt defensive strategies and view security as non-zero sum, therefore
allowing themselves simply to work to retain their own security.9 In this configuration, the old cliché that the
best offense is a good defense holds true. Chairman Mao Zedong once called for an “active defense,” by which
he meant that the Chinese must assert an “offensive defense, or defense through decisive engagement.”10 Mao’s
statement provides a springboard for this paper’s argument that China is best described as a defensive realist
state.
In order to suggest later in this paper that the People’s Republic of China’s behavior fits into a model for
defensive realism, it is necessary to elaborate first on the behaviors and actions that are demonstrative of this
form of realism. In Table 1 on the next page, many different state actions have been posited and the behavior
that corresponds to both offensive and defensive realism are explained. Descriptions of the categories of action
follow.
Power Projections of China                                                                                                                                                                 5
Table 1: Traits Associated with Different Types of Realism
Crisis refers to any political, economic, social, or military event that may arise between the focus state and
one or more actors and leads to either the threat to use force; the use of force through military exercises, tests, or
deployments; or a military confrontation that may or may not include enemy fatalities. If a researcher of foreign
policy was to analyze a given crisis that had broken out, he would observe that under an offensive framework,
the state had initiated the behavior that had led to the crisis. Under defensive realism, however, it would be
suggested that the state was acting in a reactionary manner to the threat posed.
Military modernization refers to the speed, intensity, and motivation behind a state’s military buildup
and/or weapons procurement policy. A defensive realist state seeks to obtain a military capable of a minimal
credible deterrent relative to its competitor(s), whereby the buildup of material gains is obvious, but only to the
Category of Action Offensive Realism Defensive Realism
Crisis Initiator Responds to hostile actions
(however, aggressive political
rhetoric may aggravate situation)
Military Modernization/Weapons Buildup Immediate, rapid buildup with
a goal of utilizing all
resources to maximize power
potential
Goal to modernize to parity or
near-parity levels with nearest
strategic competitor—aims to
create a credible minimum
deterrent
Domestic Social Policy Suppress domestic opposition
without responding to
international objections
Control internal dissent to the
point that state can appear
unified in its policies
Political Rhetoric Open, aggressive, unclear
intentions
Clearly defined policies and
objectives
Territory Blind projection of power to
acquire more territory as
projection potential permits
Target area viewed as defensive
perimeter within which the state
will project its power
International Organizations (IOs) Global and/or regional
rivalries, cooperation and
involvement in IOs difficult as
power projection will
decrease trust of IO members
Regional rivalries, large-scale
participation in IOs
Alliance Formation Offensive alliance possible;
after-effect of an offensive
realist on its former allies
threaten relative gains
obtained
Will only engage in regional
alliances if they play into
potential for regional hegemony
Economic Policy Pirating, economic sabotage,
exploitation of cheap
domestic labor
Champion regional resources in
large-scale, global trade
cooperation and trade
organizations, exploit cheap
domestic labor to an extent
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point that it reaches parity or near-parity with strategic peers. On the other hand, the offensive state adopts a
military policy that builds up its arsenal and consequently its national capability as much and as quickly as
possible.
Domestic social policy describes how a state’s government treats ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority
groups within the state’s border and whether they seek to blindly subjugate them or have respect for human
rights. Both the defensive and offensive realist state works to put down internal movements seeking to disrupt
state policy, yet the aggressiveness with which each variation does so differs. The offensive realist state will not
respond to international objections and pressures to curtail abuses of minorities and political dissidents. A
defensive realist state, however, stops short of blind persecution, instead working to control these movements
only to the point that the international community sees the country as unified.
Political rhetoric is a subjective idea that pertains to how a state interacts diplomatically with other states
and how said state promises to pursue its policy objectives. The concept of territory is crucial, especially to this
paper, in that it highlights a given state’s respect for the notion of the Westphalian nation-state and a nation’s
policy concerning additional territory acquisition. Where an offensive realist state will overtly declare its broad
intention to challenge the hegemon and regional competitors, the defensive realist state will be very clear in
what policies it is pursuing, the objectives behind those policies, and how it will react to any member of the
international community attempting to disrupt its agenda.
Participation in international organizations, a state’s ability and desire to cooperate, and alliances into
which a state will enter are the crux of the next two categories. Offensive realist states typically will quickly
find themselves in the middle of international or regional rivalries that disrupt the opportunity for the
development of trust—opportunities which otherwise could lead to the creation of alliances or admittance into
international organizations. On the other hand, the defensive realist state will most likely be entrenched in
regional rivalries as a result of its assertion of a defensive perimeter. Although regional alliances are highly
unlikely because of this, where they are available, such alliances will be utilized only to the point that they
assist in eventually acquiring a regional hegemonic status. Nevertheless, that same state may utilize
international organizations to bolster its international prestige and opportunities to assist in the modernization
process.
Finally, economic policy is simply the state policy of expanding its economy and securing the resources
and capital needed to do so. As it pertains to economic and energy security, the offensive realist state will assert
its power, seeking to control the oil markets to include price and output influence by using economic, political,
and military threats of and uses of force such as sanctions and military strikes. Conversely, the defensive realist
state is concerned with securing trade routes and assuring relations with export countries conducive to
continuing energy trade. Under such conditions, this would not only include military expansion to defend
energy trade routes, but such indirect strategies as maintaining a cooperative relationship with the European
Union or the United States to defend Middle East oil interests.
Going back to more general terms, power under defensive realism works as an instrument or tool to obtain
minimum policy objectives, whereas offensive realism holds power to be of supreme importance to furthering
states’ policy objectives to the fullest extent that capabilities permit.11
Defensive realists believe that much of international politics is a Prisoners’ Dilemma or a more
complex security dilemma. The desire to gain mixes with the need for protection; much of statecraft
consists of structuring situations so that states can maximize their common interests. The ever-present
fear that others will take advantage of the state—and the knowledge that others have reciprocal
worries—leads diplomats to seek arrangements that will reduce if not neutralize these concern.12
In this respect, the defensive realist will utilize a minimax strategy; maximizing minimum gain and
minimizing maximum loss. This paper argues that states that adhere to a defensive strategy will not only adopt
defensive policies, but those states will also form a sphere or arc of influence in their immediate global theater
that they will claim as a defensive perimeter. Within such a region, a state is willing to project its power to
retain control over that which it feels belongs to it. Defensive realism argues that states will respond to the
anarchy of the international system with the use of force out of fear, rather than out of hegemonic desires. It is
also important to note that both defensive and offensive realists share the idea of relative gains as all realist
states do. A defensive realist would be concerned with the relative gains necessary to secure control over its
defensive perimeter, for example, as well as all of the other prescriptions for a defensive realist state presented
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in Table 1. Similarly, while an offensive realist state is concerned with absolute gains to a great extent, it also
strives to obtain relative gains until it has the capability to overcome the defenses and conquer a territory or
state, for example, as well as the other ideas indicated in Table 1. At the same time, though, defensive realists
assert that analysts should not overstate the role of anarchy in international relations, for global interactions
provide incentives for restrained behavior. Reckless, expansionist behavior characteristic of offensive realism is
a result of domestic political factors, and not attributable to anarchy.13 In a globalized world where trade and
economic policies carry great influence and the ability to adopt internationally accepted, imperialist policies is
non-existent, a defensive strategy is likely to be the most widely accepted and tolerated.
Now that a framework for the variations of realism has been established, it is possible to explore a case
study of the People’s Republic of China. The next portions of this analysis will serve the dual purposes of
establishing the accuracy of the distinctions posited earlier between offensive and defensive realism as well as
proving that China is in fact operating within the realm of defensive realism. Earlier in this section, general
assertions concerning the behavior of both offensive and defensive realist states were explained in each of the
sectors that Table 1 presented. In order, though, to argue that China is truly a defensive realist state, this
analysis will look for specific policy and behavior traits. Most notably will be policies in the political, social,
economic, and security sector that support China’s objective in creating a defensive perimeter. Such policies
will include the harshest political rhetoric towards other regional states trying to gain control of disputed
territories in the South China Sea. Also, it is necessary to look for military modernizations that focus on
developing military capabilities with the potential to deploy successfully within this defensive cordon and not a
push for global capabilities. This analysis also hypothesizes that the economic policies of the People’s Republic
of China will pursue energy security—in particular with respect to oil—in order to support its expanding
economic and security infrastructure.

9PART TWO
Chinese Foreign Policy
The most succinct method to describing what drives Chinese foreign policy is to highlight what is suggested to
be the “informal ideology” of the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese view of
themselves is the following:
1) The Chinese are a great people, and China is a great nation, 2) The Chinese nation deserves a much
better fate than that which it has experienced in the modern world, 3) China should be accorded
compensatory treatment from those powers which have insulted or injured it in the past, and 4) As a
great nation, China naturally occupies a central potion in world affairs and must be treated as a great
power.1
This aura of arrogance and greatness has been carried in the minds of the Chinese for centuries and
modernization efforts have rekindled such calls to eminence. As the investigation of China’s foreign policies
continues, it is essential to bear in mind that the above mentioned characteristics motivate policy as an
intangible feeling that drives the country and its population towards the goal of global leadership.
Nationalism reflects the psychological necessary [sic] to draw a boundary between the Chinese and
those who are accused of imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism.2
However, China avoids the identity question by turning around and first identifying the “other”—most notably
Japan, the United States, and the former Soviet Union—instead of themselves.3 Thus, one can see the apparent
schism in China, whereby the government and population are proud and determined to ascend in the
international community, yet remain unsure about the means they should be advancing—peaceful integration
with the international system or confrontational competition.
As these sentiments and desires are molded into a comprehensive, grand national strategy, the Chinese
leadership seeks to assure that China will rise to great power status by shaping the conduct of the international
system rather than responding to its conditions.4 As such the intention seems to be focused on forming the
international conditions that provide the opportunity to increase the relative capabilities of the Chinese and in
doing so work to prevent the United States from usurping China’s rise. To that end, China views military power
as the primary guarantor of “comprehensive security,” while viewing and embracing multilateral diplomatic
efforts as partial and conditional.5 This point seems to pose one explanation as to why China asserts that
disputes concerning sovereignty issues ought to be set aside rather than settled in multilateral fora as there is
much more to be obtained in terms of relative capabilities by keeping the sovereignty question undecided,
especially out of the hands of the major powers and largest international decision-making bodies. Where it suits
the PRC to do so, though, China’s government has integrated a policy of “partnership cultivation” to deflect and
avoid controversy during its period of economic and military expansion. The Chinese leadership believes that if
great powers are put in a position to press China on controversial issues, the benefits that China can potentially
reap from the relationship such as trade and investment will be put into jeopardy. Rather it seems more
beneficial to employ policies that make China attractive to great powers while at the same time remaining
flexible by avoiding decisive alignments with particular states.6 As such, the Chinese are pursuing a setting that
is most conducive to successful pursuit of Chinese national interests.
Even within such a foreign policy framework, one of the most contentious aspects of the PRC’s foreign
policy remains its stance on sovereignty. This matter is further complicated by China’s perception of
sovereignty as,
Such an abstract concept that China would have to decide case by case if a certain issue involves the
principle of sovereignty. There is no guarantee, however, that an issue previously not considered to
have involved sovereignty concerns will not have sovereignty implications the next time. It would
appear that what sovereignty is about is itself an abstract issue.7
With these overarching remarks about the PRC’s foreign policy mentality, this work’s analysis of how China’s
practical experiences in foreign policy line up with defensive realism’s postulations can begin.
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Crises and Chinese Power Projections
After dividing realism into offensive and defensive sectors in part one, the author stated that the presence of
policies consistent with establishing a defensive perimeter would be central to defending the idea that China
was a defensive realist state. Additionally, defensive realism postulates that China will not be the initiator in the
vast majority of its crisis situation. In order to solidify these propositions, this paper will make use of Correlates
of War (COW) data8 on Chinese power projections and incidents of militarized disputes. For the purposes of
this paper, the COW data used will begin at 1978. This is the year that scholars have designated as the end (and
failure) of the Chinese Cultural Revolution when the Chinese leadership was forced to give a significant degree
of economic power and independence back to the provinces. As China’s government ended the era of The Great
Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, it subsequently moved into its modern era of foreign policy.
The COW data is presented in three sections in order to model the same analysis that this paper has
pursued. COW data is presented in terms of Chinese incidents with the United States, Taiwan, and countries
within the defensive perimeter with which this paper has concerned itself (projections towards the Middle East
are not included as none appeared within the COW data up to 19929). The countries/islands that have been
included within the defensive perimeter include Indonesia, North and South Vietnam, the Spratley Islands and
other off-shore islands, and the Philippines.10 These countries and regions have been selected because they
make claims to disputed territories and/or make direct threats to the South China Sea region, which the Chinese
have claimed as a defensive perimeter.
Between 1978 and 1992, there were no militarized incidents between the United States and China. Once in
1994 and twice in 2001, the United States and China had militarized disputes regarding US reconnaissance of
Chinese territories. In 1994, the Chinese responded to the US dropping of sonar buoys to track a Chinese
submarine and in 2001 the Chinese fired warning shots over the bow of a US Navy oceanographic vessel
because the Chinese felt that the ship was intruding on its territorial waters. Similarly in April 2001, the Chinese
downed a US Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane after claiming that it was intruding in airspace above China’s
territorial waters. In 2000, the Chinese also conducted further tests of their ICBMs in protest of the possibility
of future US sales of advanced weaponry to Taiwan. This evidence is very consistent with the theoretical
suggestions of defensive realism. This paper argues that the Chinese are currently not able to militarily
challenge US hegemonic status. However, saber-rattling techniques such as the two disputes in 2001 support the
idea that China will show its objections militarily to any other states’ intrusion on the defensive perimeter that it
feels it has the right to defend. Furthermore, while China retains a significant military loss of strength gradient
that precludes it from challenging the United States on a global scale, the Chinese will confront the United
States within its defensive perimeter where it feels that it has the political reasoning and military resources to do
so. Additionally, while the Chinese would claim that the United States initiated these crises by violating China’s
territorial sovereignty, it is evident that like defensive realism predicts, the Chinese initiated the conflict only as
a response to what were perceived as inflammatory moves by the United States within its defensive zone.
Between 1978 and 1992, there were three militarized disputes between the People’s Republic of China and
Taiwan. The three disputes occurred in 1987, 1988, and 1991 and were considered to be instigated equally by
both countries. The levels of violence included two raids and a threat to blockade; however, none of the disputes
reached very high levels of conflict. Following 1992, there has been a dramatic increase of militarized incidents
between the two states. In 1993 and 1994, China issued multiple alerts and deployed military exercises mostly
in protest of Taiwan’s push for greater international attention and what China viewed as political aggressiveness
geared towards gaining independence. In 1995 and 1996, there were multiple incidents in which China would
show its force through military deployments and exercises in order to assert control over the South China Sea
and to protest further developments towards independence in Taiwan. 1999 was a very tumultuous year for the
two states as China tested missiles over Taiwan as well as deployed air sorties over the island in response to
pro-independence remarks by the Taiwanese President concerning the desire to engage China on a “state-to-
state” level. The year culminated with China’s deployment of 100 M-Class guided missiles across the Taiwan
Strait. Commensurate with Taiwanese elections in 2000, in which a pro-independence candidate was elected,
shows of force by the Chinese greatly increased. These continued into 2001, with large-scale Chinese military
exercises and the confrontation with Australian ships that were passing too close to sensitive areas of Taiwan
and the South China Sea that the Chinese argued that they controlled.
The dynamics of the cross-strait relationship in the past twenty-four years function according to the
predictions of a defensive realist state’s crisis behavior. China does not act as a blatant initiator of
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confrontations, but rather seems to be responding to aggressive political rhetoric by the Taiwanese pro-
independence movement. Furthermore, the somewhat restrained nature of the disputes seems to reflect the idea
that China does not feel the need to project its power inside its defensive perimeter unless it feels a great enough
challenge, such as an overt declaration of independence by Taiwan. In the future, it is most likely that a similar
relationship will endure unless one or both of the following circumstances develop: 1) Taiwan declares
independence, which would almost assuredly bring about a full deployment of Chinese assets to reclaim the
territory, or 2) a significant development in the Chinese military enables the Chinese to overcome its own
military challenges to reclaiming the island with minimal collateral damage.
Finally, within the pre-determined defensive perimeter, between 1978 and 1992 there were sixteen
militarized disputes. The majority of these disputes were within the dyadic relationship between China and
South Vietnam. Of the sixteen disputes, ten belonged to the ongoing feud between China and South Vietnam,
which included seizures and all-out interstate war. The rest of the disputes included shows of force, alerts, and
the threat to use force. Only in two disputes did a seizure and border violation follow as a part of the crisis.
Following 1992, China has employed blockades and utilized its military as a show of force towards Vietnam
concerning the Spratley Islands. Until recent years, the Chinese have also been involved in militarized disputes
with the Japanese over control of the Senaku Islands. China has also used its navy nearly every year as a show
of force towards the Philippines to assert control over the Spratley Islands. Lastly, in 1996 there were shows of
force by the Chinese directed towards the Indonesians regarding the Natuna Islands.
The evidence regarding China’s use of force within its defensive perimeter is very consistent with the
predictions of a defensive realist state. In all of the sixteen disputes found before 1992, the responsibility for
beginning the crisis was shared equally between the states involved. Following 1992, the incidents that occurred
seem to indicate a very similar trend, in that China responds to other states taking aggressive stances on the
same territorial claims as China with shows of force and blockades. Additionally, the increased pace of
militarized disputes within the defensive zone seems to parallel China’s increased military and economic
influence within the region.
Hegemonic and imperialistic policies were not at the roots of China’s modern power projections. Instead,
the intrusion into what China tacitly viewed as its territory and area of influence resulted in conflict. Based on
the COW data up to 1992 and newspaper reports to date, the overall trend has been an increase in the number of
times that China has projected its power. Including those incidents involving the United States, with very few
exceptions, all of China’s modern power projections have occurred within the region including Taiwan, the
disputed territories, and the South China Sea—just as this analysis hypothesize.
Although nearly every instance of past Chinese force projection is limited to a clearly defined theater, two
caveats must be made. Between 1978 and 1986 there were five militarized disputes between China and Russia,
of which four were clashes and the fifth, interstate war. Of the five disputes, only one was clearly instigated by
the Chinese. Additionally, China confronted India in 1979 and 1985 with an alert and a military clash,
respectively. In both of these disputes, though, COW data suggests that both India and China equally initiated
the dispute. Although confrontations between these two countries and China may contradict the expectations of
a defensive realist state according to the idea of a defensive perimeter, two points can be made in defense of
these expectations. First, as defensive realism suggests, with the exception of one dispute, none of these
conflicts were clearly initiated by the Chinese. Second, the idea of a defensive perimeter was based early in this
paper on the idea of jing gho, the need for China’s borders to be secure. A challenge to the security of its
northern and western borders by Russia and India respectively may be part of the explanation for such disputes
outside of China’s defensive zone.
Military Modernization and Weapons Buildup
Military modernizations have by far brought the most scrutiny to the evolving policies of the People’s Republic
of China. The most important questions that policymakers and scholars alike have been asking are: 1) what are
the capabilities of the modern Chinese war-fighting machine? and 2) what are the intentions of the regime with
a newly modernized military? The most recent catalyst of all of this analysis was the announcement early in
2001 that the PRC would increase military expenditures by 17 percent.11 In order to understand the implications
of such a policy initiative, however, one must consider some basic theories concerning arming and the
propensity to go to war.
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One such argument is that of para bellum, which makes the case for a deterrent strategy, whereby if one
desires peace then one must prepare for war.12 At the same time, though,
…Arms buildups may only represent a shift in the balance of power that is fundamentally more
significant to the relationship than the military buildup itself.13
A country will arm itself for a variety of reasons: in response to arms buildups in a rivalry, national pride,
defensive means, future plans of projecting power in order to achieve policy objectives, and the list goes on.
This paper and adherents to defensive realism argue that a country will arm itself and modernize its military to
the point of parity or near-parity with its nearest strategic competitor. Additionally, the defensive realist state
seeks to establish a minimum credible deterrent whereby it has the military force to back up it claims to and its
projections within its defensive sphere. The objective will be to create both a theater denial capability,
especially in terms of US access to the Pacific region,14 and the means to effectively decide military incidents
with other states in the region. In the case of China, building up its military will hopefully create a credible
deterrent and thus avoid the need to project significant amounts of force into its defensive zone.
Realism suggests that displays of resolve and capability will deter aggression, so arms and allies could
help avoid unwanted conflict escalation.  If that fails, however, they are useful tools for fighting a
war.15
Accordingly, the conclusion of this brief section on the impact of military modernizations is that the actual
buildup cannot be considered a threat in and of itself. Part of the explanation for this is that military
expenditures are highly correlated with GNP, and therefore countries will arms themselves more as they have
more resources. Based on China’s rapid growth in GNP in recent decades, it should not be all that surprising
that resources dedicated to modernizing the military have increased. However, the threat emerges when one
considers how China will project its newfound military power based on its increasingly nationalistic political
and socio-economic agenda.
The rest of this section will be divided into three main sub-sections: the buildup of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenals in the Chinese military, the increase and modernization of
conventional forces, and the threat posed by continuing proliferation efforts of the People’s Republic of China.
Nuclear Weapons Modernization Efforts
According to estimates, the People’s Republic of China’s current nuclear arsenal consists of about:
400 devices, 300 of which consist of warheads and gravity [dumb] bombs for use on its strategic
“triad” of land-based ballistic missiles, bomber and attack aircraft, and one nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN)…[and] has enough fissile material to double or triple its arsenal.16
Moreover,
China is nearing an historic convergence between doctrine and capability, allowing it to increasingly
achieve a degree of credible minimal deterrence vis-à-vis the continental United States—a
convergence of its doctrine and capability it has not confidently possessed since the weaponization of
China’s nuclear program in the mid-1960s.17
That doctrine can be seen in the statements, informal motivations, and beliefs of modern Chinese foreign
policy. This effective growth in power projection capability coupled with a long-standing animosity towards the
so-called Western imperialists makes for a very tumultuous situation. The theoretical framework under which
the paper operates would conclude that China would use nuclear weapons as an “offensive, preventive war
strategy.” As modernization is still under way, there is no way that the PRC could detect, let alone defend, an
incoming attack.18 What this suggests is that China intends on continuing its nuclear buildup, albeit at lower
levels, and with a greater emphasis on more technologically advanced weapons rather than sheer numbers of
nuclear warheads and related delivery vehicles. According to intelligence community estimates, much of the
doctrine that has directed the nuclear drive and other military modernizations still carries from the policies
implored by Mao Zedong.
…Chinese communist military success of “People’s War” emphasized guerilla tactics within a
protracted war strategy, the importance of manpower over technology, the moral and physical attrition
of the enemy over times, and the importance of controlling the strategic “hinterland” to surround the
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enemy’s base in the developed urban centers. For nuclear doctrine, this translated into 1) opposition to
quick or preemptive military action from a position of weakness, 2) an appreciation for “strategic
retreat” and the primacy of defense in the interest of eventual victory, 3) a subordination of a strictly
military viewpoint to the political-military goals of the revolution and 4) the ultimate superiority of
man over weapons and technology.19
 This was the military doctrine that Mao preached would help the Chinese to emerge as a global power.
Even today, China’s strategy focuses on winning without fighting, transforming its capabilities “beyond limited
war,” and employing asymmetric and irregular warfare tactics to defeat enemies with overwhelming strength
and deployment capabilities.20 Additionally, the last point that Mao highlights—the superiority of man over
technology—seems to carry some explanation for the reason that the Chinese WMD program has progressed in
the manner that has been observed. The Chinese nuclear arsenal is still extremely limited and although it has the
capability to hit the continental United States, a credible minimal deterrent threshold (at least from the US
perspective of mutual assured destruction from the Cold War) has not yet been attained.
To underscore China’s strategy, during a meeting between a retired American military official and a high-
ranking People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer statements were issued in which tensions flared over US
support of Taiwan’s autonomy from the mainland and the use of nuclear weapons. During the exchange, the
PLA officer stated that under no circumstances would the United States deploy nuclear weapons against
mainland China, for they care more about Los Angeles than about Taipei and the rest of Taiwan. In the end, the
PLA officer stated, “If you hit us, we will hit you too.”21 This anecdote stresses the feelings that the Chinese
hold and the motivation behind their buildup of nuclear arms.
First, China’s historical perceptions of itself as a “victim” at the hands of aggressive, more powerful
states limited political choices—especially in the early years of China’s nuclear weapons
development—which may have favored more offensive and threatening nuclear postures. Second, the
period of China’s early development and eventual deployment of its rudimentary nuclear arsenal
coincided closely with a turbulent period of domestic political upheaval.22
China’s official policy on the use of nuclear weapons is that they were developed simply for defensive
purposes and that China has adopted a no-first use policy. The damning part of this argument is that the no-first
use policy only applies to states that China views as independent of itself. Regions such as Taiwan, the Spratley
Islands, and other territory in the South China Sea to which China has laid claim are not necessarily included in
such a no-first use policy (it is essential to note of course that the use of nuclear weapons in situations such as
the above mentioned is highly unlikely, for it would undoubtedly “mutilate the prize in the process”23).
Additionally, the possible futility of China’s no-first use policy simply fits with the capabilities of its current
arsenal and the failure to actually assert a credible minimum deterrent.24
Conventional Force Modernizations
In addition to the growth in nuclear arsenals, during the 1991 Gulf War the Chinese finally saw the true
capabilities of the US military and its advanced laser-guided munitions (LGMs). Such precision in weaponry
posed a direct threat to the growing Chinese arsenals and provided a further impetus for the development of
highly developed military assets. As such, in its White Paper on Defense Policy in 2000, the Chinese
government stated that its objective was to maintain a new kind of regional stability and security and to prevent
the encroachment of foreign governments on China’s sovereign interests in the South China Sea.25 Such a
statement is very consistent with the rhetoric and military posture that one could expect from a defensive realist
state. China’s conventional forces have been undergoing rapid modernization efforts and engaging in regular
war games as a form of foreign policy. It is in this sector of the Chinese military that conventional deterrence is
established. With a recent concentration on rapid mobility operations, maritime denial, long-range air raids, and
various air combat missions,26 China has striven towards forming joint operations command systems and joint
logistics systems,27 seemingly directing military planning towards commodity consolidation.
The modernization efforts have increased the effectiveness of the Chinese military, yet their military still
remains significantly below levels of parity with the US military in the Asia-Pacific region. The People’s
Liberation Army has undergone considerable changes in recent years. The national government, in attempts to
appear less corrupt to the international community, has worked to divest national industries from PLA
influence. Additionally, the 1.7 million man ground forces that comprise the PLA have been shaved down in
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order to be a more flexible structure to face the challenges of modern warfare,28 and seems to represent a more
defensive move rather than an offensive buildup. The result of this move will be to increase the mobility of
ground forces, enable the military to rapidly deploy, and decrease the amount of bureaucracy in the PLA. The
greatest hindrance, though, remains the PLA’s sealift capability, which can only carry between 10,000 and
15,000 PLA troops (plus vehicles and paratroopers).29 This deficiency places the potential for a successful
amphibious assault on Taiwan as poor at best. However, recent modernizations and decreases in the size of the
infantry will arguably make this a concern in the near term if these efforts are successful in making the PLA a
more flexible and transportable fighting asset.
Together with large-scale weapons sales from Russia, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), has
boosted its capabilities. The disclosure of plans to acquire two 8,000-ton Sovremenny-class guided missile
destroyers (DDGs)30—whose principle aim will be to reject the sea lanes of the South China Sea to anyone
opposing China’s policies in its defensive perimeter—reinforces the growth in the blue-water naval capacity of
the PLAN. One expert defense analyst posits that,
The trend in modern naval warfare in the 21st century…will likely involve states which seek to deny
control of some portion of the sea to the powerful navies, whether at a critical choke point or in the
waters adjacent to their coast.31
Recent naval acquisitions and military exercises by the Chinese support this claim as a means of defending their
defensive zone.
Finally, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is also benefiting from advanced Russian
deliveries. The Su-20MKK deep-strike and interceptor and the Su-27UBK fighter have increased the PLAAF’s
regional air superiority.32 Although by Western military standards these do not pose a credible threat to global
air superiority, in regional and localized conflicts such improvements increase Chinese capabilities
tremendously and are thus very much in line with the predictions of defensive realism’s military buildup. As an
aside, it is important to note that in the 1990s Israel opted at the last minute not to sell the Phalcon airborne
warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft to China; however, reports following the take down of the US
Navy EP-3 plane suggest that the Chinese F-8 jet was armed with Israeli-sold Python-3 missiles. This weapons
sales path will have to be closely monitored in the future, not only to see how far the Chinese are progressing,
but how much of Israel’s advanced weapons systems that are indigenously created by the United States are
being sold to the Chinese. Such sales of US-originated technology pose a threat to the United States as its
military secrets are sold by a close ally to a threat in the Asia-Pacific theater. However, the Sino-Israeli
relationship that involves the proliferation of US weaponry is a subject in and of itself that must be explored in
further analyses.
Finally, while still undergoing military modernizations, China conducts annual (if not more frequent) war
games in the South China Sea and in the Straits of Taiwan. The use of commercial frigates and freighters in
these exercises puts into question how much the Chinese need to streamline their army in order to be able to
transport more of the PLA in an amphibious attack.33 According to reports by Beijing sources,
…The main goals of the exercises are to practice “attacking and occupying an outlying Taiwanese
island and fighting off an aircraft carrier.” The mention of an aircraft carrier was seen as a reference to
the U.S. Navy.34
Such a statement of definitive purpose in the exercises underscores that the Chinese would militarily
confront the United States, but only in the sphere of influence where China asserts a defensive realist posture.
Although the modern Chinese military has increased its professionalism and its level of technology, the
Communist Party still strives to ensure unwavering loyalty to the Party through mandatory ideological training
for the rank and file military personnel.35 The Chinese government’s social policy of maintaining control over
its citizenry is easily implemented within the military structure and as such, the result is a military force always
willing to execute the policies of the central government.
By all indications, China has geared its modernization efforts into what it views as a defensive posture.
More precisely, China has streamlined its infantry and armored divisions for rapid deployment, acquired sea
vessels capable of denying access to foreign navies into the South China Sea, and bought advanced fighter
aircraft capable of regional deployments and engagements. These developments seem indicative of a very
restrained offensive buildup, capable of exacting itself anywhere within China’s defensive perimeter. It is in this
respect that these moves can be viewed as defensive, for China will most likely need to respond rapidly to a
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crisis within its defensive zone instigated by another state. Based on this analysis of Chinese military
developments, it seems that all of them are consistent with the suggestions of defensive realism.
Chinese Proliferation Policies
Coupled with nuclear and conventional military modernizations are the proliferation policies in which the
Chinese regularly engage.  Reports indicate that the Chinese assisted the Iraqis, against UN sanctions, in laying
fiber optic cable that linked Iraqi missile batteries and their long-range radar deployments.36 Additionally, on
May 1, 2001 a US spy satellite observed the shipment of nuclear-capable missile components entering Pakistan
from across the Chinese border.37 The Bush Administration has also placed sanctions on the Chinese arms
manufacturer, China Metallurgical Equipment, for continued sales of missile technology to Pakistan.38
Although some may argue that China’s proliferation to Pakistan merely seeks to offset China’s regional
competitor in India,39 fears of continued Chinese proliferation not only threaten stability of the regions to which
Chinese weapons are being proliferated but also jeopardize overarching US foreign policy concerns. The
biggest recipients of Chinese-proliferated weapons are North Korea, Pakistan, and Iraq—three countries that the
United States has at some point deemed as rogue states and against which the United States intends to deploy a
national missile defense (NMD). Finally, compounding the extensions of the Sino-Russian Friendship Pact are
reports by the US intelligence community (IC) that Russia and China are working jointly in developing systems
capable of cyber attacks against the United States through information warfare.40
Sales of technology further assist the growing Chinese economy and fund the modernizing Chinese military
projects. Policymakers in China see arms sales as a foreign policy tool and a way for China to create new
political ties with other countries.41 Such a strategy of proliferation is much more representative of a defensive
realist state than an offensive state. If China’s ambition is to create alliances and friendly political relations and
in doing so is able to benefit their economy, its behavior is most consistent with a defensive realist state.
Regardless of the destabilizing effect of weapons sales to the regions to which China proliferates, if the goal of
selling arms is to gain partners then the Chinese display defensive realist traits. The IC’s assessment of China’s
current activities is as follows:
…In the last two decades the overall scope of Chinese proliferation activities has declined across the
board. The geographic distribution of Chinese proliferation-relevant exports has narrowed from almost
a dozen countries to three: Iran, Pakistan, and to a lesser extent North Korea.42
In the Sino-Iranian relationship, it is important to note that reports have surfaced suggesting that Chinese
weapons sales to Iran have been conducted in exchange for Iran’s non-interference with upheaval in China’s
Muslim-dominated Xinjiang province. Chinese firms, outside of the central government, have also been found
to be selling dual-use missile technology products to other countries, such as to Syria, Libya, and Iraq.43
The best way to interpret recent military modernization by the PRC is that the increased capabilities of the
PLA is a military advantage in the PRC’s dyadic relationship with Taiwan and has increased the possibility for
a much more belligerent Chinese stance on reunification.44
In sum, a few points need to be reiterated concerning the modernization of China’s military. Defensive
realism theorizes that a state will increase its military assets to the point of near-parity with its closest strategic
competitor and in doing so will seek to establish a credible minimal deterrent. Coupling this is the defensive
realist state’s desire to establish a defensive perimeter within which it can effectively project its power. China
has increased its military assets in some places, utilized technological advances to increase its lethality, and
streamlined other portions of its war-fighting machine to respond to warfare challenges in the twenty-first
century. The result has been the creation of a military force posture geared to defending a defensive zone that
still retains a significant Chinese loss of strength gradient outside of this perimeter. China’s military has created
a nuclear deterrent in its region and embarked on an air force and naval doctrine centered on theater denial
capability. Finally, its ground forces have been improved to create the ability for rapid mobilization within the
defensive perimeter. As such, all of the developments of the PLA are consistent with those predictions of the
defensive realist state.
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Chinese Domestic Social Policy
Mao Zedong once referred to the United States as a “paper tiger,” and as such any serious test of America’s
resolve and ability to fight and win a war against the Chinese would be unsuccessful. Most people would
heartily reject this notion in the twenty-first century with the United States at the head of a unipolar, hegemonic
system. Instead, although Mao made this statement years ago, it continues to apply to the Chinese foreign policy
making machine as it is representative of an enduring nationalistic call to right the humiliation of the Chinese at
the hands of the West during the nineteenth century. Just one example of this comes from China’s ordinary
citizens following the attacks on the United States on September 11. Being described as a “dangerous sign of
political immaturity and chip-on-the-shoulder nationalism,” internet chat rooms on September 11, 2001 had
comments that read, “Now the day has come for the American dogs…Serves ‘em right…So cool to see America
bombed. Guys, let’s use the Internet to wage war on ‘em as well.”45 Although not representative of the
overarching political attitude in the People’s Republic of China, these statements go a long way in expressing
underlying social feelings. Considering the impact of the downfall of China following the era of dynasties,
though, it should not be surprising at all that many Chinese have adopted the feeling of jing gho or safe and
secure borders for China. This idea conveys the feeling that the Chinese want to be free from what they view as
corrupting influences from Western nations and wish to secure their own borders for internal growth and
ascension.
Part of China’s nationalism is rooted in its domestic social policy. This internal policy is a good indicator of
how foreign policy will be formed on a few different levels. First, criticism of China’s social and human rights
policies by members of the international community inevitably sours relations on other foreign policy matters
and incites a more belligerent stance by the Chinese. Second, part of China’s nationalist agenda demands that it
present a unified front to the world. The backbone of this unification is a suppressive domestic social policy.
Finally, as Table 1 indicated earlier in this paper, a defensive realist state will have very clear political policy
objectives and an attempt to subvert these will result in power projection. One of these objectives is the
international recognition of the right to national sovereignty. The Chinese are ardent in their belief that one
nation should not meddle in another sovereign country’s issues. As such, a social policy that operates without
regard for international condemnation supports this belief. Accordingly, if the Chinese deem it inappropriate for
members of the international community to comment on its social policy, then surely much stronger objections
will follow in foreign policy decisions such as Taiwan, which China believes to be the issue of a sovereign
nation.
Typically, realism does not allow for one to inspect the domestic factors that motivate state policy because
it assumes a unitary state. However, this component of realism must be relaxed, as China’s nationalist agenda
demands a unified front to present to the world. In order to create this singularity, China’s central government
has suppressed various internal voices within the state. Accordingly, the social aspects of Chinese domestic and
international affairs in recent times must be analyzed in order to predict effectively how its government will
project its power in the near term. Defensive realism has incorporated this flexibility into its interpretation of
realism and theorizes about likely domestic policies for a nation. It suggests that a state will control internal
dissent to the point that it appears unified in its national policies to the international community. A defensive
realist state will be able to be differentiated from an offensive realist state, though, in that it will respond to
some degree to international pressures against the suppression of minorities and opposition voices.
Although many inside the mainland hold deep sentiments about the aura of greatness to which they believe
China is intrinsically blessed, there are social groups that are ostracized by the communist regime in hopes of
retaining a firm hold over the population and conveying a unified image to the rest of the world. Much of this
internal strife is concentrated in the Xinjiang Province of Western China. There, the communist Chinese forces
continue to crack down on Muslim separatists in what remains a tremendous human rights problem in the
country. This region, comprised heavily of Uighurs, a Turkic-speaking group of Muslims, is a locale of
continuing government persecution and the only place that people are regularly put to death by the regime for
trying to divide the country.46
The Chinese government says that the executions are meant to keep the separatist threat in check,
arguing that Beijing is battling Islamic terrorists not unlike those the United States is fighting in
Afghanistan, just a few hundred miles away.47
Though the United States is currently waging a war against terrorism, the threat from within China is not
commensurate with the type of crackdowns being observed. This justification by the Chinese is part of the fine
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line between offensive and defensive realist social policy. The Chinese responded to international criticism of
the treatment of Muslim citizens by trying to rationalize the policy in terms of the US war on terrorism,
something to which the United States and international community could relate. Innocent and guilty alike are
executed regularly with no clear explanation or warning to their families. Additionally, the observance of
Muslim holidays such as Ramadan are discouraged by tax breaks for stores and restaurants that stay open
during prayer hours, and children are encouraged to eat meals during the fast at school.48 All of this state
violence continues, even though the Uighurs pose little to no violent threat to the state apparatus. Continuing
instability in the Xinjiang region also threatens oil exploration efforts and pipeline construction between China
and Central Asian reserves that have been seen as a potential alternative to growing Chinese-Middle Eastern oil
dependency.49 Not only are pipelines in jeopardy for their own security, but also the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang is
arguably the biggest domestic oil production possibility in the near term.50 Disruption and sabotage of refining
and extraction efforts by separatist Uighuirs threatens the greatest hope for a modicum of Chinese self-
dependence.
In addition to the suppression of minority Muslim rights in the Xinjiang Province, workers’ rights have
been compromised in the movement towards incorporation into the global capitalist market.
As private and foreign companies race ahead in newer industrial centers…a new kind of working class
is emerging, one dominated by rural migrants who have no tradition of unions or the security once
enjoyed in state enterprises.51
Instead of receiving proper rights such as fair pay, health care, adequate working conditions, and fair hours of
labor, this new breed of workers in the multinational corporation factories that have proliferated in China for the
cheap labor have been exploited in hopes of obtaining a slightly cheaper product.
Working to join the WTO and to be a sponsor of the Olympics underscores the Chinese desire to push
concerns for these domestic human rights abuses out of the way of international scrutiny so that China’s image
can continue to rise as defensive realism would predict. Additionally, working to join the WTO is an objective
also rather close to the hypotheses of defensive realism. In order to respond to international pressures
concerning workers’ rights, China worked to increase the stakes for continued international objections by
incorporating the protests into the framework of trade relationships instead of acceding to the remonstrations of
other countries.
Additionally, in seeking to maintain its image as a unified and effective Communist regime, the Chinese
government monitors tens of thousands of its own citizens in order to assure Party loyalty and in order to
crackdown on any persons that attempt to challenge its rule.52 Part of this involves the continuing crackdowns
on personal freedoms by the communist regime through attempts to curb the proliferation of internet usage in
the country, by imposing restrictions on websites that run counter to the Party’s objectives in what has been
termed the “Great Firewall of China.”53
On the whole, domestic social policy is one of the more difficult aspects of defensive realism to prove. Part
of this draws from the natural schism that exists between realism and internal state policies. However, social
policy provides a gauge by which one can predict foreign policy direction based on the treatment of domestic
social groups. In China’s case, the international community has voiced its disapproval of China’s human rights
record. However, China has been able to sidestep the issue without ignoring the international community and
other nations, but by increasing the stakes of protesting by inciting fear of trade disruptions. Consequently,
based on the cases of domestic social policy presented above, it is the conclusion of this author that were the
international community to take a firm enough stance and demand reform within China and present
repercussions for non-compliance, China would likely acquiesce to some degree. It is for that reason that China
represents a defensive realist state with respect to domestic social policy more so than an offensive realist
nation.
Political Rhetoric in Communist China
In the late Stalin era, the principles of Communist foreign policy that were shared by all such states at the time
argued the world was composed of two hostile camps in which the Socialist states and its allies are aligned
against the so-called imperialist states.54 Over a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, China still views itself
entrenched in a rivalry with the Western states, namely the United States.
18                                                                                                                                                                         Eric Nathaniel Heller
[O]ld paranoias and antagonisms, lurking beneath the surface of China’s status quo internationalism,
surfaced after 4 June 1989, reminding us that at least the Old Guard and its designated successors to
the ideological presuppositions and reflexes of forty years ago were still present.55
Instead of trying to confront its adversary in a lopsided military confrontation, China has adopted a policy
by which it shuns the outside world and seeks to maintain control over its defensive sphere of influence.
Defensive realism claims that a state will have clearly-defined political objectives, whereas the offensive realist
state will employ open and aggressive political rhetoric with intentions that are unclear at best.
Scholars of the Chinese political system argue that were the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy ever to
come under serious threat (although an internal threat), no rhetoric or diplomatic coercion by the United States
could halt a massive Chinese military engagement with any of its competitors, notably Taiwan.56 Such an
argument represents two very clear political objectives that theorists of defensive realism have argued would
exist. One is the necessity of the survival of the Chinese Communist Party and the second is the retention of
Taiwan as part of mainland China. In the previous section, it was argued that China views its crackdown of
separatists in the Xinjiang region as a justified move, much like the retaliatory strikes executed by the United
States on targets in Afghanistan after September 11. At the same time, though, the official statement by the
Chinese government was “wary support” for the American strikes. The Chinese continue to offer political
acquiescence to the West that is motivated by the need for continued help in the economic modernization
process.57 This is evidence that the government in Beijing tends to remain rather schizophrenic in order to
appease the West for continued support and in terms of its own human rights abuses, but then only offers
marginal support for Western policies when they are seen as potentially inflammatory to the domestic political
scene in China. Were China to be an offensive realist state, one would more likely observe much more
belligerent political rhetoric and a fundamental lack of support for any US or Western initiative that did not
directly support Chinese control of its defensive perimeter and economic growth and prosperity. Part of the
need to avoid aggressive rhetoric that does not show clear Chinese intentions is a limit on how far Beijing can
take economic warfare through rhetoric and policy without damaging ties to the United States and Japan, and
keep sources of foreign investment which are vital to economic growth and survival of Communist Party
power.58
Central to maintaining an environment favorable to the Communist Party are lessons learned from the
Soviet experience. The Chinese witnessed the ill effects of glasnost and perestroika and thus the Chinese
Communist Party is reluctant to introduce reforms.59 Additionally, creating positive relations with other
countries is crucial for continued growth of China. Clear and transparent rhetoric, followed by logical policies is
the only way for such an environment to be fostered. One example of this is that tight ties with Russia are
needed to solidify opportunities for necessary arms transfers and trade.60 Only by using rational and controlled
political rhetoric and policies by which defensive realism is characterized can the Chinese enjoy the benefits of
positive relations.
On the other hand, the future of Chinese foreign policy may hinge on underlying political attitudes and
perceptions by the Chinese government. Feelings of soft containment and strategic isolation of China by the
United States could cause China to become more aggressive and less cooperative.61 For example, recent efforts
by the United States to strengthen relations with Russia and Japan may be viewed by China as a form of
isolation. Consequently, China’s political rhetoric, especially with respect to policy within its defensive
perimeter would likely become stronger and quarrelsome. It is believed that China is greatly concerned with the
US willingness to deploy forces to the Straits of Taiwan in defense of Taiwan as well as the warming relations
of the United States with Australia and Japan. In many respects, the Chinese not only fear that Japan would
become more active in the Straits due to US pressures, but more broadly perceive the onset of a wave of
policies designed to contain China.62 With the recent inclusion of the Russian Federation as a junior NATO
partner, China’s fears of being isolated within the East Asia and Pacific region seem likely to be agitated even
further.
Political rhetoric, much like domestic social policy, does not directly impact foreign policy as much as the
other components of Table 1. However, like social policy, it acts as a litmus test by which one can estimate
China’s future foreign policies. Defensive realism proposes that a state will use clear policy objectives as
opposed to open and aggressive language. China has been very clear about its intentions to defend and project
power into areas of its defensive zone. It has also been clear, more so by China’s attitudes than rhetoric, that
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continued threats or perceived threats to either the survival of the Communist Party or continued growth in
China will result in stronger articulations of its policies and intentions.
Policy on Territory and Territorial Claims
One of the central, if not the central, tenets of defensive realism is that a state will view a target area as a
defensive zone within which it is willing to project its power as necessary. Therefore, it would likely follow that
a state’s policy on territory and territorial claims would incorporate those territories to which it lays claim.
Additionally, a state is willing to conquer those territories that it claims as its own if a great enough threat to its
defensive perimeter is perceived. In the case of China, one additional argument is made with respect to
territorial claims and sovereignty issues. As a part of China’s policy of claiming a defensive zone, it cites the
need for respect for national sovereignty. Accordingly, wherever a crisis arises in the world where territorial
sovereignty issues are even a question, one can expect the rights of the nation being intruded upon to be eagerly
defended by China.
Part of China’s defensive perimeter stems from Chinese claims to 80 percent of the territory within the
South China Sea. Problems such as the fact that 70 percent of Japanese oil imports travel through this territory
and past confrontations with the Australians over such waterways underscore that a defensive cordon has been
implemented by the Chinese consistent with the hypotheses of defensive realism. Extensive analysis has already
been conducted concerning power projections into China’s defensive zone and need not be revisited extensively
in this section. Needless to say, crisis behavior, military modernization trends, and political rhetoric all support
the notion that China has created a defensive perimeter within which the territories and countries are subject to
Chinese power projections.
Additionally, as a part of China’s defense of territorial sovereignty issues, the Chinese have continued to
defy Western powers, especially the United States, in their policy towards Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War.
China’s policy stance on Iraq serves two purposes in the Chinese political machine. First, the supposed erosion
of national sovereignty is very similar to the argument used against US assistance to Taiwan. Issuing such an
opinion towards the Iraqi situation deflects attention that this might be an argument for reunification with
Taiwan. Second, as was discussed in the earlier sections concerning economic and military modernization,
China’s flow of oil from the region and its sale of weapons systems to Iraq are greatly compromised if a
continuation of sanctions policy against Iraq continues or if the United States deploys its military to oust the
Hussein regime. As such, China’s official position remains that the
Sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Iraq must be preserved and any such
violation of these rights is and should be punished as violations of international law.63
This statement provides a validation for why the Chinese are able to create and project into a defensive
zone. The true test of this belief will remain to be seen if and when the Chinese are placed in a situation where
any aspect of Operation Iraqi Freedom or any subsequent operations within Iraq are voted on in the UN Security
Council and the PRC is placed in a situation where it would decide to either vote for or against, abstain or
exercise its veto. Additionally, because they have the clear political objective of maintaining control or at least
status quo power over its defensive perimeter, China has satisfied two core arguments of defensive realism:
political rhetoric and territorial policy.
International Organizations and Alliance Formation
In the past decades, as China’s economy, military, and political institutions have modernized, so too has its
behavior with regard to international organizations and its willingness to enter into alliances. Defensive realism
argues that a state will adopt cooperative behavior so long as it remains beneficial to the state’s power
amalgamation and does not interfere with a nation’s securing of its defensive zone. However, defensive realism
states that regional rivalries will be rampant and therefore a defensive realist state will only include itself in a
regional alliance if it will play into that states’ potential to become a regional hegemon. Consequently, any
alliance that exists on a regional level will be states weakly tied together, and instead the defensive realist state
will participate in large-scale international organizations. On the whole, China’s behavior coincides very closely
with these postulations.
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A 1959 Sino-Soviet friendship pact underscored potential for cooperative behavior by the Chinese and on
July 16, 2001, the two states once again signed an agreement of friendship and cooperation which opposed US
NMD plans and backed China in its pursuit to reunify Taiwan with mainland China.64 Such a political move
underscores the transient nature of the Stalin-era rhetoric elaborated on in the section concerning political
rhetoric, and reinforces the belief that China still feels a high degree of competition with Western nations. This
Russian-Chinese alliance, though, is not even close to the strength of the 1959 treatise because the two nations
are still very suspicious of one another—consistent with defensive realism’s theory on regional alliances. At the
same time, though, $1.5 billion has been traded from Russia to China and 40 percent of Russian arms exports
are destined for China.65 One perspective of this modern relationship is that China views working cooperatively
with the Russians as a defensive policy, working to craft foreign policy that will balance against the United
States. As defensive realism purports, China has adopted a policy of cooperation that suits its purposes of
offsetting the US global influence, specifically in China’s theater of operations.
Additionally, in the past five years or so, China has geared its economic and trade policy towards joining
the World Trade Organization. General trade and work to gain admittance into the WTO comprise an essential
part of the economic segment of Chinese foreign policy. China’s ascension into the WTO offers promise for
much of the American business community, but also threatens the ability of the United States to protest extreme
violations of international human rights norms and will thus throw such arguments into the international forum.
Therefore, as defensive realism suggests, joining the WTO allows the Chinese to appear to be a responsible and
peaceful participant in a large-scale international organization. The economic benefits of the WTO provide
China with unparalleled opportunities for trade and economic expansion. Such involvement also serves a dual
purpose of restricting the degree to which other states, namely the United States, can protests China’s domestic
social policies or any power projections within its defensive perimeter.
Finally, China’s bid to harness power in a centralized regional arc is underscored by its moves to gain
political leverage with states of the region.
As more and more Pacific nations suffer from political upheaval and aid dependency on the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, it appears China is offering millions of dollars in untied
“grants” to governments in the region that seek an alternative.66
This alternative to international lending houses could arguably lead to a regional hegemony that could be
defended by the modernized military and growth in economic strength seen in China’s recent development.
Beijing has also used membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum to
fend off efforts to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea.67 Both of these policies of the Chinese
government are consistent with defensive realism’s argument that a state is self-serving in the degree to which it
is cooperative with other nations in the region. In both of the above cases, China has appeared cooperative in
order to gain financial leverage over other Asian-Pacific nations. Additionally, efforts to use ASEAN
underscores the argument that China will appear to be an active member in international organizations so long
as this involvement assists in securing a defensive zone and thus status as a regional hegemon.
Economic Components of Chinese Foreign Policy
As scholars debate China’s growth and its future role in the international community, the topic of debate that
typically arises just after military modernization is that of the immense growth in Chinese gross domestic
product (GDP). China’s increasing economic strength and influence has placed it in a position of great leverage
with its trading partners. Moreover, it has become incumbent upon the Chinese government to ensure economic
growth to buttress a political order whose ideology collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union.68 Defensive
realism makes the argument that a state will work to champion regional resources, join global trade
organizations, and exploit cheap domestic labor, as these actions suit a policy of economic growth. China’s
economic policy has been somewhat hampered by its dependence on resources and capital, namely oil and other
energy products, to sustain its growth. The growth in China’s economy and its policies regarding power
projections and the need to have a military to defend its economic assets are commensurate with this
dependence and defensive realism.
One of the greatest problems of Chinese dependence is domestic oil consumption. Such a large emphasis is
placed on this policy because problems concerning the control and security of oil deposits could prompt the sale
of conventional weapons and development and proliferation of nuclear weapons in order to maintain these
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resource flows.69 In 1998, China’s dependence on external oil imports had grown to 26 percent and domestic
demand for crude oil products has continued to rise.70
With fuel oil, LPG [liquefied petroleum gas], and diesel demand likely to continue steady growth in
1999, particularly as the government continues its large-scale infrastructure investment projects, oil
consumption is likely to increase by a further 1.5 to 3.0%.71
The growth in government-sponsored investment projects, coupled with a trend already having domestic
demands in excess of domestic production potential, provided the impetus for an increase in dependence on
foreign oil imports. A continuation of current trends suggests that by 2020, China’s domestic demand for petrol
products would exceed its domestic production by a factor of two.72 Compounding this trend are estimates that
by 2020, China could be 90 percent dependent on oil exports from the Middle East.73 Such forecasts suggest
that the exorbitant sums of money that are sure to reach the Middle East from China will arguably become
entangled with a growing arms and technology trade pipeline between the two regions, destabilizing two
already insecure regions.
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In working to solve its oil deficit, the PRC has looked to places such as Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Sudan,
Iraq, and Peru for oil imports.74 It may not be surprising to note the connection between potential oil suppliers
such as Sudan and Iraq and the appearance of Chinese-sold weapons systems.
They’re paranoid about it…China and India will grow more aligned to the Middle East. It’s a good bet
that China will barter weapons for some of the oil…a mysterious trading company under the Chinese
Defense Ministry—outside of the normal state oil-importing apparatus—imports 150,000-plus barrels
a day from Iran. China’s oil insecurity helps to explain its interest in building a navy. Indonesian
waters are infested with pirates and the archipelago is in danger of a social meltdown. Millions of
barrels of oil a day already flow through the choke point of the Strait of Malacca to Northeast Asia.75
Herein lies the connection between possible oil-for-weapons programs conducted by the Chinese
government and part of a desire to have a regional monopoly on blue-water naval capabilities. Most of the
motivation behind this is the future threat to export routes in the oil market generated by localized conflicts and
regional instability.76 The problem is complicated by the crossing of multinational oil trade routes through the
region and multiple territorial claims on waterways and lands that are in the middle of these same routes. As
China’s oil imports increase, they will attempt to safeguard their oil lanes. China claims 80 percent of the South
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China Sea as Chinese territory and 70 percent of all of Japan’s oil imports pass through this same South China
Sea.77 This clash of interests suggests that the tumultuous situation may only get worse if these disputes are not
adjudicated and current oil consumption and military modernization trends continue. China’s energy policy will
become a much greater focal point for potential conflict in the future if its current net importation trends
continue and its desire to become further involved in the global economy based on an oil-dependent
infrastructure continue. Consequently, claims to oil-rich regions in the South China Sea may become a much
greater concern for military deployments and a source of insecurity in the region,78 as defensive realism
predicts.
While expanding its economy, the People’s Republic of China has created an enormous trade imbalance
with the United States. By utilizing cheap domestic labor and resource prices, the Chinese have gained leverage
over the United States that poses a threat to future US economic security. The evolution of this dyadic trade
relationship is illustrated in Figure 2.79
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The gap between the United States and China and indications of growing discontinuity in the trade balance
endangers prospects for a fair bilateral trade relationship in the future. Hopefully, admittance and faithful
participation in the WTO will bring about the idea of free and fair trade in the global community. In addition,
reports in the early days of George W. Bush’s administration indicated that China’s need for the United States
as a viable and growing market in the future would outweigh its anger at many US policies such as those in
Iraq, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and the militarized dispute over the downing of the US
Navy reconnaissance plane.80 Moreover, if China becomes confrontational with the United States, its
opportunities for increased integration into the global economy are compromised in addition to providing the
United States with wiggle room to strengthen its ties with Taiwan.81
Economic explosions in Taiwan and in Hong Kong have arguably motivated mainland China to expand its
economic potential to new heights. From Taiwan’s perspective, there has been a significantly increasing
outflow of high-tech companies to the mainland in search of cheap labor.82 The trend that is emerging is of a
Taiwan that is tied to the mainland to a much higher degree then they ever could have predicted or probably
desired. One example of this trend is the lifting of investment curbs with the mainland by Taiwan to provided
China with the infrastructure to pair with its large engineering-trained workforce to produce raw materials for
advanced microchips.83 Logically, Taiwan may face the same fate of a trade deficit as the United States;
however the stakes for Taiwan will be much greater.
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Growing trade deficits between China and the United States and Taiwan reveals a lot about the prospects
for conflict in the future. As the United States and Taiwan both become more dependent on Chinese products,
the potential for China to project its power increases dramatically. The growing degree of China’s economic
leverage increases the costs for any military intervention by the United States in response to China’s foreign
policy initiatives. Additionally, as Taiwan’s dependence on China’s economy increases, its ability to implement
inflammatory policies such as pro-independence statements diminishes greatly.
Based on the economic case study of China, nearly all of its economic policies are consistent with a
defensive realist state’s traits. The policies that China has adopted have resulted in such remarkable economic
expansion that now position China in a leveraging stance, whereby it can defend its power projections into its
defensive perimeter. Moreover, many scholars point to China’s behavior during the 1997 East Asian Financial
Crisis in which China opted not to devalue the yen, accepting the costly effects of such a decision in light of
stabilizing the precarious economic situation. As observers speculated about the potential devaluation of the
yen, holding off on such a move arguably increased Beijing’s repuational payoff.84 By increasing its influence
on global trade, China has increased the stakes of intervention by any of its biggest trading partners. Of the
Chinese policies most likely to elicit strong international objections, the most noteworthy are power projections
intent on securing oil trade routes from the Middle East. Additionally, as defensive realism argues, China is
seeking to champion regional resources and oil extraction projects inside of its defensive zone. Such a
circumstance would be the best situation for the Chinese, whereby it could secure energy resources via power
projection, yet limit international sanctioning of such policies by maintaining growing global trade imbalances
in its favor.
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PART THREE
Conclusions Concerning Defensive Realism and the Future of Chinese Power Projections
At the outset of this analysis, it was argued that China’s foreign policy is consistent with a defensive realist
scheme. Broadly speaking, the argument is that China views amounts of security in the international system as
infinite, and as such has adopted a policy by which it builds up economic and security apparatuses until it feels
that it could adequately defend itself. At the same time, China views the calculus of the international system as
dictated by anarchy in which there is no central authority to assert what is right and what is wrong. The social,
political, economic, and security developments that have occurred in the last couple of decades are consistent
with a state intent on consolidating power in a post-Cold War Communist society and opposing what it views as
an imperialist tendency on the part of the West. Specifically, the nationalist agenda in both mainland China and
Taiwan towards incorporation and independence, respectively, is responsible for much of the harsh rhetoric and
diplomatic conflict that has continued to exist both between Taiwan and China as well as between China and the
United States.
While the COW data and news reports presented in the section “Crises and Chinese Power Projections”
provide as assessment of the short-term implications of China’s modernization efforts, Figure 3 presents a
slightly broader perspective.1
Figure 3
Figure 3 depicts a possible growth path for a status quo power and a challenger based in principle upon
Organski’s Power Transition Theory.2 According to Organski’s theory, the time just before and just after the
PRC achieves parity with the international community are the ones at which the PRC feels confident enough
that it can effectively project its power with minimal objection from the international community (near-parity is
defined as 80 percent of the dominant country’s power3). Likewise, defensive realism suggests that a state will
seek to modernize to levels of parity or near-parity with its closest strategic competitor(s). That said, the point at
which an adequate level of parity has been reached is the time in which the upcoming state can pursue and
secure its defensive sphere in an overt fashion without fear of compromising its growing status in the world.
Additionally, many have argued that China is in the process of trying to undermine US hegemonic status in the
world.4 This argument is based in part on the supposition that if China, while still relatively weak, faced a
serious threat from one or more great powers, it would likely resort to Cold War-style “counter-hegemonic
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balancing.” On the other hand, if the PRC’s relative capabilities significantly increase or threats are not felt
from others in the international community, China might work to reshape the global system to be more
favorable to its own interests.5 According to Figure 3, the point at which either a transition war or peaceful
transition will take place is still very far away (just after the year 2015). Therefore, one can ascertain whether
the Chinese will pose a threat to the United States in the long term based on its behavior before and after it
reaches parity levels with the international community (the average world projection). If a sustained level of
power projections within China’s defensive cordon follows the Chinese reaching parity with the international
community, the United States will likely feel that its hegemonic status is threatened, in turn causing the United
States to initiate a preventive war. On the other hand, if China peacefully transitions as it ascends without
projecting its power within the Asia-Pacific region, then the United States may be able to adopt more
cooperative strategies. In reality, though, the possibility for a preventive war by the United States is very
unlikely, as the US economy would face costs that do not come close to exceeding the benefits of stifling
China’s growth. Noteworthy, though, is that in a semi-cooperative relationship such as that of the United States
and China—with a satisfied hegemon and dissatisfied challenger—the emerging relationship is most likely a
confrontational competition highlighted by many sub-war disputes of varying length and severity.6 Therefore,
unless critical changes in the underlying dyadic relationship are altered, the long term Sino-American
relationship is not necessarily certain war, but rather a tense relationship characterized by military and economic
competition and increasing political, military, and economic confrontations. Correspondingly, defensive realism
would suggest that as China’s regional power and control over its defensive perimeter increase and its power
projections accordingly increase, US and Chinese interests will come into greater conflict in the Asia-Pacific
region, resulting in higher numbers of crises and power projections.
Currently, there exists a loss of strength gradient outside of China’s direct military sphere of influence that,
in the near term, has very little hope of being overcome. As such, China’s potential for challenging the United
States on a global scale is highly unlikely. That same loss of strength gradient also restricts the degree to which
the Chinese can project direct military power into the Middle East. Therefore if one is to analyze the future of
power projections towards the United States, Taiwan, and the Middle East, a rather clear picture begins to
emerge. China is somewhat of a threat to all of these countries and regions. From the US perspective, political
showdowns such as the one over the downed reconnaissance plane on Hainan Island underscore China’s work
to become a force in the international arena and efforts to avoid having to kowtow to US policies.
In the Middle East, oil export and military transfer trends indicate continued Chinese military support
through proliferation and direct military assistance to various countries in the region. The need to solidify
Middle East oil resources is imperative for the PRC, especially because domestic and regional sources of oil are
proving difficult to obtain. The question following from the convergence of oil exports and military trends asks
whether China is willing and able to project its power into the Middle East in order to secure oil resources.
Militarily speaking, this would be very difficult to say the least, and relative gains in the international forum
would probably be erased by the economic and political costs. However, evidence exists that China has
supported modifications to improve Iraqi air defense systems and continued military sales to Iran, Syria, and
Libya.
Finally, the question regarding China’s willingness to invade Taiwan and other territorial claims in the
region must be asked. Based on the conclusions of this paper these seem to be the most likely targets of Chinese
power projection in the near term. Taiwan and the multitude of other islands that fall under what China
considers to be a defensive umbrella are directly threatened by increasing Chinese power. Obtaining these
territories is part of China’s belief in secure borders. The economic impact of having these countries is
important to China on account of the natural and technological resources that such territories possess.
Additionally, the political value of asserting China’s power and claiming what it feels to be rogue nations is
invaluable. The continued growth of the Chinese economy assisted in great part by a growing dependence on oil
necessitates control over the trade routes through which they pass. Accordingly, trends indicated by the COW
data and reports since the COW data expired support the notion that in the near term, China will most likely
project its power into its defensive perimeter. At the same time, though, China surely acknowledges the high
costs that would be associated with such power projection endeavors. Therefore, while the threat is most likely
within this defensive perimeter, China would abstain from a serious military incursion unless another regional
member made a move, such as Taiwan declaring independence or the Philippines militarily occupying the
Spratley Islands.
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Conclusions
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, international relations scholars have worked to create a framework by
which they could understand China’s behavior and the direction in which it is headed. This paper refined
realism into a structure that explains a very specific type of country. Defensive realism characterizes a state that
is increasing its power in the economic, political, security, and social sectors of its society and willing to project
it power into a defensive zone. It is from this idea of a defensive perimeter from which the probable behaviors
in Table 1 were drawn. By securing a defensive zone and thus a regional hegemony, a state that is seeking to
compete with the global hegemon can first confirm its potential. With very few and explainable exceptions,
China’s behavior corresponds extremely well with the suggestions of defensive realism. As such, this paper has
provided a framework by which China’s behavior in the near term can be analyzed. Additionally, by
understanding China’s policies based on defensive realism, policy planners in the United States can truly
understand what ought to be viewed as genuinely threatening behavior and those which need not elicit a hostile
response.
In many respects, analysts are correct in arguing that China believes that nominal support and membership
in the Western-dominated international community will allow it to change the rules of the system from the
inside. Consequently,
[c]ommon interest evaporated with the end of the Cold War, in which [the United States and
China] were united in containing the Soviet Union. Now China, freed from threatening
Russian forces to the north and Soviet client Vietnam to the south, is expanding its strategic
reach east and south by claiming rights over the whole South China Sea and increasing its
influence in Southeast Asia. “Enjoying the advantages of size, demographic weight and
centrality, China is demanding a free hand in East Asia.”7
China is rapidly rising as the United States and the rest of the world continue to grow at a steady pace. Is
the world about to see a large-scale war between the United States and China, or even a proxy war in the Middle
East? No. However, the caveat to that answer is that diplomatically and politically, the Chinese have tested the
waters of hostility and coercion with the United States and arguably lost. Parity with the United States is at least
a decade away, yet parity with the rest of the world is rapidly approaching. Power projections are possible and
likely in some form in the near term unless actions by the international community and the United States
commit to adjudicating conflict over territorial disputes and assure the Chinese of their security with present
territory. Only with such an initiative will China’s pursuit of security in an anarchical system be controlled, and
regional and international security be upheld.
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